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NOTES
WHO ARE THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION FOR LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS?
The United States Constitution unequivocally vests the federal
courts with jurisdiction over cases involving controversies between "cit-
izens of different states."' Section 1332(a) of Title 28 of the United
States Code2 codifies federal court diversity jurisdiction.' While Con-
gress specifically included corporations within the statutory definition
of citizens,4 no similar uniform rule exists for dealing with unincorpo-
rated associations.' As a result of this omission, courts have treated
1. "The judicial Power shall extend to. . .Controversies. . between Citizens of different
States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2. Section 1332(a) provides in pertinent part:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between. . . citizens of different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
3. The term "diversity jurisdiction," as used in this Note, refers to federal jurisdiction based
on complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and defendant. The phrase actually
embraces cases in which jurisdiction is predicated upon either diversity or alienage. For a discus-
sion of the history and purposes behind the grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts see
13 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
4. "[A] corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorpo-
rated and of the State where it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)
(1976).
5. The term "unincorporated association" includes partnerships, limited partnerships, joint
stock associations, business trusts, labor unions, and fraternal organizations. 13 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 3, § 3630. Since 1900, the Supreme Court has treated unincorporated associa-
tions as aggregates of individuals. See Great So. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449
(1900). For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the Court considers the citizenship of each of the
"persons composing" the association relevant. Id. at 456. See infra text accompanying notes 33-
38.
In United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 147 (1965), the Supreme
Court held that the citizenship of an unincorporated labor union is determined by the citizenship
of each of its members. In response to the Court's holding, the American Law Institute proposed
that Congress give unincorporated associations the same "fictional treatment long accorded to
corporations with respect to citizenship and ... locate them for diversity purposes in the state of
their principal place of business." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUrE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURIS-
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associations,6 particularly limited partnerships,7 with uncertainty when
DICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Official Draft 1965) [hereinafter cited as ALI
STUDY].
State statutes governing unincorporated business associations confer varying legal rights on the
members of these associations. See, e.g., UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (ULPA) § 7, 6
U.L.A. 582 (1969) (limited partner not liable to creditors); ULPA § 9, 6 U.L.A. 586 (rights, pow-
ers, and liabilities of a general partner); ULPA § 10, 6 U.L.A. 590 (rights of a limited partner);
ULPA § 26, 6 U.L.A. 614 (parties to an action). Some state statutes accord unincorporated as-
sociations the capacity to sue and be sued in the association name. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-112 (West 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2051(2) (1968); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW
§ 1025 (McKinney 1976).
Federal courts disagree about the roles these varying statutes should play in determining citi-
zenship of unincorporated associations. In recent years, federal courts have employed three alter-
native methods to gain jurisdiction over unincorporated associations. The association may sue or
be sued: (1) as an entity under an applicable state common name statute; (2) as an aggregate of
individuals, either by joinder of all members, when they are jointly liable, or individually, when
the members are severally liable; and (3) as a class, by designating one or more members of the
association as representative of the class composed of all the members. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 3, § 1861, at 451-53. This Note is limited to a discussion and analysis of the second
method.
6. As distinguished from a corporation, an "association" is a group of persons organized
without a charter, but acting together in the methods and forms used by incorporated bodies for
the pursuit of some common enterprise. Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 157 (1924). Unlike a
corporation, an association is not ordinarily a legal entity distinct from its individual members.
See, e.g., Brocki v. American Express Co., 279 F.2d 785, 787 (6th Cir. 1960); Sperry Prods. v.
Association of Am. R.Rs., 44 F. Supp. 660, 662-63 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 132 F.2d
408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1942). Moreover, unincorporated associations are not
accorded the status ofjural persons. Eg., Calagoz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1962);
Lowry v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 259 F.2d 568, 570 (5th Cir. 1958). See generally H.
HART & H. WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 917 (lst ed. 1953); 3A J.
MOORE & J. LUCAS, J. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.25 (1982). For a discussion of unincor-
porated associations, see supra note 5.
7. Originally the limited partnership was used by small groups of investors to conduct intra-
state transactions. More recently, it has grown in popularity and is used as a method for securing
capital for all forms of business ventures. Often a limited partnership will involve hundreds of
investors, and will engage in multistate business transactions. Comment, Limited Partnerships and
Federal Diversiy Jurisdiction, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 384, 394-95 (1975). According to the ULPA,
limited partnerships are composed of general and limited partners. ULPA §§ 1, 9-10, 6 U.L.A.
562, 590. The rights, powers, and liabilities of the two types of partners vary greatly. See infra
note 22 and accompanying text. Professor Bromberg describes the limited partnership as follows:
A limited partnership is formed by compliance with statutory requirements. It consists
of (a) general partners, who manage the business and have the same liability as in an
ordinary partnership, and (b) limited partners, who take no part in management, share
profits, and do not share losses beyond their capital contributions to the firm. A limited
partner may forfeit his limited liability by taking part in control of the business. In most
other respects, limited partnerships are like general partnerships.
A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIPS § 26, at 143 (1968). The main purpose
of such a relationship is to persuade people who have capital to become partners with those who
possess skill. Because limited liability follows the limited partner, he is not responsible for the
general obligations of the partnership. Only the capital contribution is imperiled. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss4/5
Number 41 REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST 1053
determining diversity jurisdiction.
In Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache Co. ,' the Second Circuit, recogniz-
ing that under applicable state law a limited partner lacked capacity to
sue on behalf of the partnership in the situation which gave rise to the
litigation, concluded that only the citizenship of general partners was
relevant to the diversity determination.9 More than a decade later the
Third Circuit, in Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Savings & Loan
Association,1 expressly rejected the rule laid down in Colonial Realty
and held that the citizenship of both limited and general partners was
relevant to the diversity determination.I' The Supreme Court has not
considered this precise issue and the split of opinion continues to grow.
The Fifth Circuit and at least one federal district court in the Fourth
Circuit' z follow ColonialRealty while the Third Circuit steadfastly con-
tinues to follow its decision in Carlsberg Resources. 3
In Navarro Savings Association v. Lee,'4 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed a related question when it clarified the application of federal
diversity jurisdiction to cases involving a different form of unincorpo-
rated association-the business trust. 5 The Court applied its long-
standing rule that only the citizenship of those who are "real and sub-
stantial parties to the controversy" determines diversity jurisdiction.16
Thus, the citizenship of the beneficial shareholders, who retained se-
8. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
9. Id. at 183.
10. 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
11. Id. at 1260-61.
12. See Lee v. Navarro Say. Ass'n, 597 F.2d 421 (5th Cir.), aj'd, 446 U.S. 458 (1980); C.P.
Robinson Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships, 375 F. Supp. 446 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
13. See Trent Realty Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1981).
14. 446 U.S. 458 (1980), aft'g 597 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1979).
15, A business trust is a voluntary association which possesses many of the attributes of a
corporation without formal incorporation and its attendant statutory regulation. The Supreme
Court has defined the business trust as:
[A] form of business organization... consisting essentially of an arrangement whereby
property is conveyed to trustees, in accordance with the terms of an instrument of trust,
to be held and managed for the benefit of such persons as may from time to time be the
holders of transferable certificates issued by the trustees showing the shares into which
the beneficial interest in the property is divided.
Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 146-47 (1924). 4ccord Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408,416, 292
P. 624, 627 (1930) (per curiam) (trust created when legal title to property transferred to trustees
with accompanying managerial and discretionary powers over principal and profits of the enter-
prise); Enochs & Flowers, Ltd. v. Roell, 170 Miss. 44, 51, 154 So. 299, 300-01 (1934) (defining
"trust" as a business organization in which property is conveyed to trustees who hold and manage
it for the beneficiaries).
16. The real party in interest terminology first appeared in Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U.S. (8
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verely restricted powers of intervention and control, was irrelevant and
the trustees possessed the right to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of
the federal court on the basis of their own citizenship.17  By rejecting
both the incorporated and unincorporated association analogies, the
Court impliedly refused to extend its decision beyond this particular
form of unincorporated association.'" Despite this tacit limitation to
business trusts, however, the majority's interpretation of the real party
in interest doctrine is potentially applicable to determinations of diver-
sity jurisdiction involving other unincorporated associations.,9
A year after the Supreme Court's decision in Navarro, the Third Cir-
cuit refused to apply the Navarro real party in interest reasoning to
limited partnerships.2" In Trent Realty Association v. First Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Association,21 the court held that the citizenship of limited
partners,22 as well as general partners,23 must be considered for pur-
Wheat.) 421 (1823). Addressing the issue of joinder of parties in a suit involving actions by a
trustee allegedly constituting a breach of trust, the Court stated:
This Court will not suffer its jurisdiction to be ousted by the mere joinder or non-joinder
of formal parties; but will rather proceed without them, and decide upon the merits of
the case between the parties, who have the real interests before it, whenever it can be
done without prejudice to the rights of others.
Id. at 451 (citation omitted).
17. 446 U.S. at 458, 465-66.
18. Justice Blackmun, the only dissenter in Navarro, stated that he was "troubled by the
Court's intimation that business trusts are to be treated differently from other functionally analo-
gous business associations-partnerships, limited partnerships, joint stock companies, and the
like." Id. at 475 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Blackmun stated that the major-
ity opinion expressed no view on the appropriate method for determining the citizenship of lim-
ited partnerships. Id. at 475 n.6.
19. Courts and commentators have advocated that the application of the real party in interest
test to diversity determinations is most consistent with the policy behind the jurisdictional statutes.
See, e.g., Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1262 (1977)
(Hunter, J., dissenting); Comment, Diversily Jurisdiction over Unincorporated Business Entities:
The Real Party in Interest as a Jurisdictional Rule, 56 TEX. L. REv. 243, 250-51 (1978); Comment,
supra note 7, at 410-11, 417-18.
20. Trent Realty Ass'n v. First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29, 32 (3d Cir. 1981).
21. 657 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1981).
22. The ULPA provides that limited partners are not "bound by the obligations of the part-
nership." ULPA § 1, 6 U.L.A. 586. Nor shall a limited partner "become liable as a general
partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes
part in the control of the business." Id. § 7, 6 U.L.A. 3 8-39. Additionally a limited partner is "not
a proper party to proceedings by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce
...[his] right against or liability to the partnership." Id. § 26, 6 U.L.A. 349. For a discussion of
the varied interpretations of the ULPA and the degree of reliance to be reasonably placed upon
the Act's declaration of limited liability, see A. BROMBERO, supra note 7, § 26, at 147-50.
23. Like officers in a corporation, general partners assume the managerial responsibilities of
the partnership. General partners, however, are personally liable in suits against the partnership.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss4/5
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poses of determining diversity jurisdiction.24 The Third Circuit found
nothing in Navarro that compelled application of the real party in in-
terest test to limited partnerships.25 Concluding that the Court's deci-
sion in Navarro had not overruled a previous circuit decision on the
citizenship of limited partnerships,26 the Third Circuit felt bound by
precedent. As a result, it was unable to adopt a view that would look
only to the citizenship of general partners in determining whether fed-
eral jurisdiction exists.27
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Navarro and
examines the use of the real party in interest doctrine to resolve the
current split of opinion surrounding determinations of diversity citizen-
ship for limited partnerships. Section I traces the development of di-
versity jurisdiction determinations in suits involving unincorporated
associations. Section II discusses the unresolved conflict among the
federal courts over the determination of diversity jurisdiction for lim-
ited partnerships. Section III analyzes the Navarro decision its inter-
pretation by the Third Circuit in Trent Realty. This Note concludes by
suggesting that courts should apply the real party in interest reasoning
employed by the Supreme Court in Navarro to cases involving limited
partnerships, and thereby follow the approach first advocated by the
Second Circuit in Colonial Realty.
I. DETERMINING DIVERSITY FOR UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
The theory that a corporation is considered a citizen of the state of its
incorporation, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is now well settled
ULPA § 9, 6 U.L.A. 586 (rights, powers, and liabilities of a general partner). See also supra note
7.
24. 657 F.2d at 32.
25. Id.
26, "We do not read Navarro to require us to depart from the precedent of Carlsberg Re-
sources. " Id. (construing Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254
(3d Cir. 1977)) (holding that citizenship of limited partners must be considered in determining if
complete diversity exists). See infra notes 48-68 and accompanying text.
27. 657 F.2d at 32. For cases declaring that identity of citizenship between a limited partner
and the opposing party does not destroy diversity, see Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358
F.2d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Robinson Constr. Co. v. National
Corp. for Hous. Partnerships, 375 F. Supp. 446, 449 (M.D.N.C. 1974). Cf. Mason v. American
Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 401 (2d Cir. 1964) (joint stock association is citizen of the state where
formed); Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355, 371 (3d Cir. 1948) (same); Erving v.
Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (limited partnership is
citizen of state of its sole general partner); Sands v. Galler, 321 F. Supp. 558, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(dictum) (same).
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doctrine.28 Moreover, section 1332(c) of Title 28 of the United States
Code provides that a corporation is a citizen of any state by which it
has been incorporated and in which it maintains its principal place of
business.29 No statute similarly provides for the citizenship of unincor-
porated associations, however. As a result, two methods have evolved
to assess the citizenship of unincorporated associations for purposes of
diversity. Using one approach, the court examines the association's
characteristics to determine if it is sufficiently corporate-like to be
treated as an incorporated entity. If so, the court assigns citizenship on
the basis of the state of association. Using the other method, the
court foregoes the corporate analogy and considers the unincorporated
association as a mere collection of individuals.3 ' Diversity under this
method therefore depends upon the citizenship of the "persons com-
posing" the association.32
28. In the 1958 amendment to § 1332(c), the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that "[ijt is
now established doctrine that a corporation, for the purposes ofjurisdiction, is deemed a citizen of
the State in which it is incorporated." S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3099, 3101.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976).
30. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933); Mason v. American Express
Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Adams Express Co., 22 F. 404 (C.C.D.
Md. 1884); Fargo v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry., 6 F. 787 (C.C.D. Ind. 1881); Maltz v. American
Express Co., 16 F. Cas. 566 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1876).
Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933) involved the question of whether a socledad
en comandita, an unincorporated association organized under Puerto Rican law, could be treated
as a citizen for purposes of diversity. Departing from prior decisions which focused upon whether
or not a state had granted an organization a corporate label, the Court examined the socledad's
essential characteristics in light of the law under which the association was created. The Court
then determined whether these features entitled it to corporate diversity treatment. Among the
important characteristics upon which the Court focused were its creation pursuant to publicly filed
articles of association and its capacity to contract, own property, transact business and litigate in
its own name. The Court also considered the sociedad's powers of management vested in the
hands of managers who alone could act to legally bind the group. Id. at 481.
In Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964), the Second Circuit followed
the Supreme Court's lead and examined the essential characteristics of the organization before it
determined whether the organization was complete enough to warrant treatment as a separate
entity for diversity purposes. The court found that the New York joint stock association exhibited
virtually all of the corporate-like characteristics identified by the Supreme Court in the sociedad.
Thus, the court reasoned, these essential characteristics were sufficient to invest the joint stock
association with a legal personality separate from that of its individual members. Id. at 399-400.
31. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny, 382 U.S. 145 (1965) (unincorpo-
rated labor union); Great So. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900) (limited partner-
ship); Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889) (unincorporated joint stock company); Carlsberg
Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977); Colonial Realty
Corp. v. Bache Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
32. Great So. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456 (1900).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss4/5
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The Supreme Court has applied the "persons composing" test to all
forms of unincorporated associations. In Chapman v. Barney,33 the
Court held that a joint stock company34 organized under New York
law was not a corporation.35 As a result, the company could not invoke
federal jurisdiction unless it alleged that all of the members were
shown to be of citizenship diverse from that of the opposing party.36
Relying on Chapman, the Court, in Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co.
v. Jones37 extended its reasoning to limited partnerships and held that
diversity jurisdiction must be determined by looking to the citizenship
of both the limited and general partners.38
Some lower courts have further refined this "persons composing" ap-
proach by distinguishing between those partners who should and
should not be considered relevant to diversity jurisdiction determina-
tions.39 Underlying this refinement is a deference to the Supreme
Court mandate that jurisdiction should turn upon the citizenship of
only those persons with real and substantial interests in the contro-
versy.40 Courts employing this reasoning determine the real parties in
33. 129 U.S. 677 (1889). Chapman was the Supreme Court's first opportunity to address the
issue of citizenship of unincorporated associations.
34. A joint stock company is a form of unincorporated association. See supra note 5. It is a
non-statutory business organization created by agreement of the parties. Like a corporation, a
joint stock company has centralized management and transferable shares, although the members
maintain property rights and liabilities similar to partners in a general partnership. A. BROM-
BERG, supra note 7, § 34. See generally R. ROWLEY & D. Siv_, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIP 610-12
(2d ed. 1960).
35. 129 U.S. at 682. The Court reasoned that "although it may be authorized by the laws of
the State of New York to bring suit in the name of its president, that fact cannot give the company
power, by that name, to sue in federal court." Id
36. Id.
37. 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
38. Id. at 456. Over forty years later, the Supreme Court returned to consideration of the
citizenship of an unincorporated association. In United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny,
382 U.S. 145 (1965), the Court addressed the question of whether a labor union could be consid-
ered a citizen of the state of its principal place of business for diversity purposes without regard to
the citizenship of its members. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Fortas relied on Chapman
m concluding that the union could not be treated as an entity and, therefore, the citizenship of its
members controlled the diversity determination. Id. at 151. Justice Fortas discussed the practical
difficulties in treating a union as an entity for diversity purposes. Unlike corporations, all of
which have a chartering state and a principal place of business, labor unions may have local,
distmct, and international organizations but no state of formal organization. Id. at 152. There-
fore, the Court refused to extend diversity jurisdiction, concluding that only Congress could ex-
tend entity citizenship to unincorporated labor unions. Id. at 150-51.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
40. See supra note 16.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1058 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
interest by looking to those members of the limited partnership who are
vested with the capacity to sue.4 Federal courts disagree, however,
whether to adopt this modification of the Chapman-Great Southern
rule. An examination of the opinions of the Second and Third Circuits
clearly illustrates the controversy which exists among lower courts.
II. THE COLONIAL REALTY-CARLSBERG RESOURCES CONFLICT
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the first federal
appellate court to address the question of which members of a limited
partnership-general partners or general partners and limited part-
ners-were relevant to a determination of diversity jurisdiction. In Co-
lonial Realty Corp. v. Bache Co. ,42 the court acknowledged the rule
established in Great Southern,43 but concluded that only the citizenship
of general partners was relevant for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.44
Judge Friendly, writing for the court, based this conclusion upon a pro-
vision of the New York Partnership Law, which provides that a limited
partner is not a proper party to proceedings by or against a partnership,
unless the suit is one to enforce his rights against or liability to the
partnership.45 Reasoning that a limited partner lacked capacity to sue
in the situation before the court, the court held that identity of citizen-
ship between the plaintiff and a limited partner did not destroy juris-
diction properly founded upon complete diversity between the plaintiff
and each general partner.46 Courts in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits47
follow the rule announced by the Second Circuit in Colonial Realty.
In Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Savings & Loan Associa-
41. See supra notes 7, 19 & 22.
42. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
43. 177 U.S. 449 (1900). See supra notes 38 & 39 and accompanying text.
44. 358 F.2d at 183.
45. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115 (McKinney 1948). This law is virtually identical to ULPA
§ 26. See supra note 22.
46. 358 F.2d at 184.
47. See Lee v. Navarro Sav. Ass'n, 597 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir.), a 'd, 446 U.S. 458 (1980);
C.P. Robinson Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships, 375 F. Supp. 446, 449 (M.D.N.C.
1974). See generally Note, Diversity Jurisdiction and Limited Partnershifps, 1977 B.Y.U.L. REV.
661, 671-72 (real party approach of Colonial Realty is consistent with the underlying statutory
policy of diversity jurisdiction); Note, Diversity Jurisdiction-Identity of Citizenship Between De-
fendants and Some Limited Pariners in PlaintiTParnership Precludes Federal Jurisdiction Based on
Diversity Citizenshp, 27 EMORY L.J. 165, 183-85 (1978) (Colonial Realty the most reasonable re-
sult of an application of FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) to unincorporated associations).
[Vol. 61:1051
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tion,48 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explicitly rejected the
Colonial Realty holding. In Carlsberg Resources, the sole general part-
ner of a limited partnership brought suit against a Pennsylvania corpo-
ration. The plaintiff-general partner was a California corporation but
some of the limited partners were Pennsylvania citizens. The Third
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for want of diversity juris-
diction,49 noting that although Chapman and Great Southern were both
pertinent to resolving this diversity question, no Supreme Court deci-
sion was precisely on point." The partnership was seeking diversity
jurisdiction on the theory that partners of different status may be
treated differently for determining diversity of citizenship.5" The court
acknowledged that Great Southern involved an association in which all
members were of a single class and therefore possibly of little prece-
dential value in resolving the issue at bar. 2 The court interpreted
Chapman as having involved an association with two classes-the pres-
ident, who possessed the power to litigate on behalf of the association,
and all the other members of the joint stock association. 3 Despite this
distinction, the Supreme Court in Chapman held that all members
must be considered in determining diversity jurisdiction. The Third
Circuit regarded Chapman, therefore, as a refusal by the Supreme
Court to differentiate between classes of members when determining
whether complete diversity exists.5 4 Based on this interpretation, the
court concluded that finding diversity jurisdiction in the case would
constitute a broad extension of federal jurisdiction, detrimentally af-
fecting judicial economy and the principles of federalism.55
Because the Carlsberg Resources court considered the determination
of jurisdiction fundamental to the federal courts, it was troubled by the
Second Circuit's consideration in Colonial Realty of capacity-to-sue
48. 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
49. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa.
1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
50. 554 F.2d at 1259.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1258.
53. Id. Similarly, by definition limited partnerships have two classes of members: "A lim-
ited partnership is a partnership formed by two or more persons. .. having as members one or
more general partners and one or more limited partners." ULPA § 1, 6 U.L.A. 562. The distinc-
tion between the liability of its members is what distinguishes limited partnerships from general
partnerships and joint stock companies.
54. 554 F.2d at 1259.
55. Id. at 1262.
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before settlement of the jurisdictional issue.56 The possible ramifica-
tions of reference to state law in determining diversity jurisdiction also
disturbed the Third Circuit. Such reliance, the court reasoned, would
invest state legislators or state courts with the power to determine the
perimeters of federal jurisdiction and thereby make diversity jurisdic-
tion dependent upon frequently inconsistent state laws. 7 Additionally,
the majority argued that if the Second Circuit were relying upon rule
17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure58 as authority for apply-
ing the New York state rules on capacity-to-sue, the court violated the
command of rule 8259 not to construe any of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Judge Hunter, the lone dissenter in Carlsberg Resources, was particu-
larly concerned with the far-reaching impact this decision could have
in effectively foreclosing limited partnerships from obtaining complete
diversity and, thus, access to the federal courts.6 1 Judge Hunter, agree-
ing with the approach taken by Judge Friendly in Colonial Really,6'
considered the majority's examination of citizenship before determina-
tion of capacity-to-sue to be misordered.6 2 While mindful that capac-
ity-to-sue is a separate issue from diversity, the dissent noted that such
a determination would, nevertheless, properly reflect the real parties to
the controversy.63 Because state law indicated that each member in a
general partnership should be counted for purposes of diversity, Judge
Hunter felt that state law indicated that limited partners should not be
considered.' Moreover, he found the majority's reliance on Chapman
56. Id. at 1260.
As we view it, jurisdiction is the most elemental concern of the federal courts in evaluat-
ing the cases which come before them. By contrast, issues pertaining to the capacity to
sue, while hardly lacking in significance, are deserving of consideration only after thejurisdiction of the federal court has been firmly established.
Id. (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 1261.
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b) provides in pertinent part:
The capacity of an individual other than one acting in a representative capacity to sue or
be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile.
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides that the Federal Rules:
[Sihall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district
ourts....
60. 554 F.2d at 1263 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
61. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). See supra notes 43-47.
62. 554 F.2d at 1263 (Hunter, J., dissenting). Judge Hunter thought it impossible to properly
determine diversity, as the majority did, before first determining the proper parties to the suit.
63. Id. at 1263 n.6.
64. Id. at 1264-65.
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and Great Southern inapposite because of the unique nature of limited
partnerships,65 epitomized by the purpose of limited partnerships and
the provisions in the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which restrict
the powers and the liability of limited partners.66 In noting the clear
statutory prohibition against limited partners taking part in suits in-
volving the partnership, Judge Hunter considered the majority's inclu-
sion of these parties in a diversity determination illogical.67 In
conclusion, the dissent found the policies behind diversity jurisdiction
well served by allowing limited partnerships access to federal courts on
a finding of complete diversity between all the general partners and the
opposing parties.68
The Supreme Court has not addressed the specific issue of whether
the citizenship of limited partners should be considered for purposes of
determining diversity jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the recognition of a
strong analogy between limited partnerships and business trusts69 war-
rants an examination of the Court's decision in Navarro Savings Associ-
ation v. Lee.7°
III. INTERPRETING NAVARRO SAVINGS ASSOCIATION V. LEE
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the question of
whether, for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction, the citizen-
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1265. See supra notes 5 & 7 (discussing provisions of the ULPA).
67. Id. Accord 16 DUQ. L. REv. 221, 236 (1978)(criticizing the adverse impact of the Carl-
sberg Resources holding); 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 657, 669 (1978) (criticizing the practical effect
of the Carlsberg Resources decision in barring limited partnerships from federal courts).
68. 554 F.2d at 1266 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
69. Business trusts are hybrids of traditional common law trusts, developed in Massachusetts
between 1910 and 1925 in response to statutory prohibitions against corporations dealing in real
estate. H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 58, at 86 (1970). See generally supra note 15 (definition of
business trust); R. ROWLEY & D. SIVE, supra note 34, § 55.1. These "trusts" are unincorporated
associations organized as a means of carrying on a business enterprise and sharing its profits.
Unlike the common law trust, the business trust is not concerned with holding and conserving
particular property through trustees who have incidental powers, but with providing a medium for
the conduct of business and the sharing of profits. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 357
(1935). Accord Carey v. United States Indus., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 794, 795 (N. D. Ill. 1976); Plym-
outh Sec. Co. v. Johnson, 335 S.W.2d 142, 149 (Mo. 1960). Business trusts, like partnerships,
"carry on business in a fictitious or collective name." Kempner v. Welker, 36 Ariz. 128, 131, 283
P. 284, 285 (1929). Like limited partners, the beneficial shareholders are not generally liable for
trust debts. In contrast, trustees, like general partners, are normally personally liable for trust
debts. Eg., Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321,327, 159 N.E. 250, 253 (1927); Ing v. Liberty
Nat'l Bank, 216 Ky. 467, 469, 287 S.W. 960, 961 (1926).
70. 446 U.S. 458 (1980).
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ship of a business trust is determined by looking to the citizenship of its
trustees or to that of its beneficial shareholders in Navarro Savings As-
sociation v. Lee." The suit was brought by eight trustees of a Massa-
chusetts organized business, Fidelity Mortgage Investors, to recover
damages from Navarro Savings Association, a Texas corporation, for
breach of a loan commitment agreement.72 All eight trustees were citi-
zens of states other than Texas and asserted jurisdiction based on diver-
sity of citizenship.7 3 The district court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction holding that the citizenship of each of the shareholders was
to be considered in determining diversity.74 The Fifth Circuit re-
versed,75 finding that the Declaration of Trust granted the trustees all
powers to control and manage the trust and to litigate on its behalf, free
from any powers or control of the beneficiaries.76 The court analogized
to the limited partnership reasoning of the Second Circuit in Colonial
Realty and concluded that the trustees were the real parties to the con-
troversy.77 Because complete diversity existed between the plaintiff-
trustees and the defendant-corporation, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that federal diversity jurisdiction existed.78 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the court of appeals in an 8-1 decision,79 holding that the trust-
ees of a business trust may invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts on the basis of their own citizenship without regard to
71. Id.
72. Id. at 459. In 1971, respondents Fidelity lent $850,000 to a Texas firm. The loan was
partially secured by Navarro Savings and Loan Association. When Navarro refused, in 1973, to
cover its obligation to Fidelity, respondents brought suit seeking $1,174,525.17 plus interest and
attorney's fees. Lee v. Navarro Sav. Ass'n, 597 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1979), aj'd, 446 U.S. 458 (1980).
73. 446 U.S. at 459-60. Navarro's complaint asserted federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 based on diversity of citizenship. The complaint stated that Navarro was a Texas citizen
and that each respondent was a citizen of a state other than Texas. Thereafter the parties stipu-
lated that some of Fidelity's beneficial shareholders were Texas citizens. Id.
74. 416 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (N.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd, 597 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1979), a Jd, 446
U.S. 458 (1980).
75. 597 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'g 416 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Tex. 1976), aft'd, 446 U.S. 458
(1980).
76. Id. at 424. Article III of the Declaration of Trust, entitled "Trustees Power," provided:
The Trustees shall have, without other or further authorization, full absolute and exclu-
sive power, control and authority over the Trust Estate and of the business and affairs of
the Trust, free from any power and control of the Shareholders, to the same extent as if
the Trustees were the sole owners of the Trust Estate in their own right. ...
Id.
77. Id. at 424-25.
78. Id. at 428.
79. 446 U.S. 458 (1980), aj-g 597 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1979). Justice Blackmun filed a separate
opinion dissenting.
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the citizenship of the trust's beneficial owners.8 0
The majority found merit in the Fifth Circuit's approach to the real
party in interest determination. Rejecting Navarro's assertion that Fi-
delity's beneficial shareholders were the real parties to the controversy,
the Court focused on the powers the trust agreement granted to the
trustees and beneficiaries."1 Although Fidelity's Declaration of Trust
provided that the shareholders could elect and remove trustees, amend
the terms of the trust, vote on any disposition of more than half the
trust estate, and terminate the trust agreement, 2 the majority found
that the shareholders had no power of control or intervention except
under extraordinary circumstances.8 3 Relying upon established princi-
ples of trust law,8 4 the Court stated that the powers of a trustee to hold,
manage, and dispose of trust assets for the benefit of the shareholders
are the standards by which to determine whether a trustee possesses the
"customary" powers which make him the real party to the contro-
versy.85 Fidelity's trustees held the requisite rights and duties to qual-
ify as trustees and had filed suit in their capacity as trustees, seeking to
recover on promissory notes executed in their names as trustees.
Therefore, the Court concluded, resemblance to other forms of business
enterprises did not alter Fidelity's trust character nor change the status
of the trustees as the real parties in interest.8 6
Justice Blackmun dissented, finding the majority's opinion con-
clusory, its approach simplistic, and its result contrary to the Massachu-
setts law of business trusts.8 7 Unlike the majority, Justice Blackmun
80. 446 U.S. at 465-66.
81. Id. at 462, 465.
82. Id. at 465 n.14 (citing Fidelity Declaration of Trust, Arts. 2.2., 6.7, 8.2, 8.3, app. A47, A67,
A79-A80).
83. Id. at 464-65. The Court focused on the fact that Fidelity's 9,500 beneficial shareholders
had no voice in the initial investment decision and had no control over the case at bar. The Court
concluded that Fidelity was an express trust and the trustees held legal title to the trust property.
Id.
84. See Bullard v. Cisco, 290 U.S. 179 (1933). The Bullard Court followed the rule that a
trustee is the real party to a controversy for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction. Id. at
190.
85. 446 U.S. at 464.
86. Id. at 465. The majority reasoned that because no allegation was made of sham or collu-
sion and the trustees were clearly active trustees and not "naked trustees" acting as "mere con-
duits," the fact that the trust departed in some respects from conventional forms had no bearing
on the determination of diversity. Id.
87. Id. at 466-67 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted the substantial body of
recent district court decisions which conflicted with the majority's position. Those cases held that
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employed the control test,"8 which identifies the real parties in interest
by evaluating the amount of control the trust indenture vests in particu-
lar members of the trust. Justice Blackmun found the powers vested in
the shareholders by the trust indenture were substantial enough for this
agreement to be considered a partnership. 9 While he agreed with the
approach taken by the court of appeals, he could not agree with the
holding in light of the large measure of control the shareholders pos-
sessed." In Justice Blackmun's opinion, the Court's prior decisions
concerning unincorporated associations and real parties in interest9t
should have led to the conclusion that the beneficial shareholders of
this business trust were the real parties in interest and their citizenship
was determinative of the diversity issue.92
In Trent Realy Associates v. First Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion,93 the Third Circuit found nothing in Navarro which dictated the
use of the Court's real party in interest reasoning in determinations of
diversity citizenship of limited partnerships.9 4 The Third Circuit fo-
the citizenship of the beneficial owners of a business trust was dispositive in determining diversity
jurisdiction. Id. at 466 n.l.
88. Id. at 468-71.
89. Id. at 472.
90. Id. at 475-76. The dissent noted that factors which are relevant to determining which
members of a business trust are the controlling parties include: "(1) the right to remove the trust-
ees, (2) the right to terminate the trust, (3) the right to modify the terms of the trust, (4) the right to
elect trustees, and (5) the right to direct management decisions of the trustees." Id. at 476 n.8
(quoting Comment, supra note 7, at 416). Justice Blackmun found the first four factors present.
Id. Justice Blackmun also stated that the shareholders "have the power to condition major dispo-
sitions of the trust assets on their affirmative approval." Id.
91. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny, 382 U.S. 145 (1965); Great So. Fire
Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900); Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889). See also
supra note 5; text accompanying notes 33-38.
92. 446 U.S. at 476 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. 657 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1981).
94. Trent involved the validity of a mortgage due-on-sale clause. Under threat of foreclo-
sure the plaintiffs, Trent Realty Associates, a limited partnership and the current owner of the
property, and Norstar Realty, a New Jersey corporation and current mortgagee of the property,
filed suit in New Jersey state court seeking a declaratory judgment against enforcement of the
penalty provision in the mortgage agreement. Defendant, First Federal, a Pennsylvania based
savings and loan association and the former mortgagee of the property, removed the action to the
Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey on the basis of diversity of citizenship. On
appeal after summary judgment for the defendant, the Third Circuit raised the question of federal
subject matter jurisdiction. An affidavit submitted by Trent showed that one of its limited part-
ners was a Pennsylvania resident. Thereafter, Trent belatedly claimed that lack of complete diver-
sity destroyed federal jurisdiction. Id. at 30-32.
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cused upon the Navarro majority's statement9 that business trusts are
neither corporations nor unincorporated associations. The Trent court
also noted Justice Blackmun's remark96 in dissent that the majority ex-
pressed no view on the issue of determining diversity jurisdiction for
limited partnerships. The Third Circuit concluded, therefore, that the
Navarro holding was limited to determinations of diversity for business
trusts, and did not overrule Carlsberg Resources.9 7  As a result, the
court of appeals was bound by circuit precedent and held that identity
of citizenship between a limited partner and a member of the opposing
party destroyed diversity jurisdiction. 98
The Third Circuit's interpretation of Navarro is overly narrow.
While the Navarro majority made no explicit reference to the Fifth Cir-
cuit's analogy between a business trust and a limited partnership, it did
not explicitly reject the position that Fidelity shared some attributes of
such an association. 99 Moreover, affirmance of the reasoning used by
the Fifth Circuit suggests that the Court did not intend its rationale to
be limited to express trusts. Furthermore, application of the Navarro
interpretation of the real party in interest test to various forms of unin-
corporated associations, such as limited partnerships, in which the rela-
tive rights and responsibilities of the members are statutorily defined,
would be less complicated than application of that interpretation to
strictly organized business trusts.
IV. CONCLUSION
To date the Supreme Court has done nothing to weaken its holdings
in Chapman" and Great Southern.10 1 These two cases may be read,
nonetheless, as holding only that courts will not grant unincorporated
associations entity status analogous to corporate treatment for purposes
of diversity jurisdiction. Thus, these decisions do not bar application of
95. We need not reject the argument that Fidelity shares some attributes of an associa-
tion. In certain respects, a business trust always resembles a corporation. But this case
involves neither an association nor a corporation. Fidelity is an express trust, and the
question is whether its trustees are real parties to this controversy for purposes of a fed-
eral court's diversity jurisdiction.
Navarro Sav. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 462 (1980).
96. See id. at 475 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. 657 F.2d at 32. See supra text accompanying notes 48-59.
98. 657 F.2d at 32.
99. 446 U.S. at 462.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
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the real party in interest approach which the Court employed in
Navarro in the context of business trusts, to limited partnerships.10 2
Additional support for applying the Navarro real party in interest
test to limited partnerships can be gleaned from close scrutiny of the
seemingly irreconcilable rationales advanced in early Supreme Court
decisions on corporate entity citizenship and denial of that status to
joint stock companies.'0 3 In Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,'"
which established corporate citizenship before the enactment of section
1332(a), 105 the Court concluded that the citizenship of the shareholders
was irrelevant because they had no control over the corporate litigation
and thus were not real parties to the controversy. 10 6 In Chapman v.
Barney,10 7 however, the Court declared that the citizenship of all the
members of a joint stock association was relevant to determining diver-
sity. By labeling the association a partnership,'0 8 the Court implicitly
recognized that each member was liable for the company's debts. 10 9
Consequently, each member was a real party to the suit.
The Court's reasoning in these two cases is eminently applicable to
limited partnerships. Individual financial liability and degree of con-
trol are the two most important differences between general and limited
partners. 10 They may reasonably be used as major determinants in
establishing the real parties to a suit. Furthermore, the liability of lim-
ited partners is more closely analogous to that of corporate sharehold-
ers than to that of members in a joint stock association. Limited
partnerships are created under statutes patterned after the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act."' Section 1 of the Uniform Act expressly
provides that limited partners are not personally liable for the obliga-
tions of the partnership."I2 The official comments to section 1 state that
"a limited partner is not in any sense a partner" and is not a principal
102. See Comment, supra note 7, at 413-19.
103. See Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889); Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 314 (1853).
104. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). See supra note 2.
106. .d. at 326.
107. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
108. Id. at 681.
109. See Comment, supra note 7, at 389 (relying upon Rowley, supra note 34 at 610-12).
110. See supra note 7.
111. See ULPA § 1, 6 U.L.A. 562 comment.
112. Id.
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in transactions of the partnership." 3 Thus, as the responsibilities of the
partnership do not bind the limited partner, those of a corporation do
not bind the shareholder. These definitional restrictions and functional
differences point to the conclusion that the Navarro real party in inter-
est test, which looks to the varying control and liability assigned parties
to a trust, is well suited to the determination of whether limited part-
ners should be counted in determining diversity jurisdiction.
Rachel F Best
113. Id.
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